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Carmen McLeod1,2 and Sarah Hartley3
Abstract
The use of animals in experiments and research remains highly contentious.
Laboratory animal research governance provides guidance and regulatory
frameworks to oversee the use and welfare of laboratory animals and relies
heavily on the replacement, reduction, and refinement (3Rs) principles to
demonstrate responsibility. However, the application of the 3Rs is criticized
for being too narrow in focus and closing down societal concerns and
political questions about the purpose of animal laboratory research. These
critiques challenge the legitimacy of responsibility in laboratory animal
research governance and call for new approaches. With the advent of the
"Responsible Research and Innovation" (RRI) agenda, we investigate
whether the notion of responsibility in the controversial area of animal
research governance could be enhanced by examining the 3Rs through RRI.
Our analysis reveals RRI has the potential to helpfully augment the 3Rs in
three key ways: recognizing the need to include a broader range of experts
and publics in animal research governance; emphasizing the importance for
animal research scientists of taking societal, and not just role,
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responsibilities into account; and acknowledging the political questions
animal research raises.
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Laboratory animals are used for researching the efficacy and safety of new
medicinal products, to test biological and chemical substances, and to
develop knowledge about human and animal biological processes. Labora-
tory animal research governance provides guidance, regulatory frame-
works, and licenses to oversee the use and welfare of laboratory animals.
However, the use of animals in laboratories remains a highly contentious
issue and over the past four decades, there has been an increase in public
skepticism and mistrust about justifications for animal experimentation to
advance scientific goals (Michael and Birke 1994; Ormandy and Schuppli
2014; von Roten 2012).
In 1959, Russell and Burch first introduced the three principles of
replacement, reduction, and refinement known as the 3Rs (see Kirk Forth-
coming). In the laboratory animal context, “replacement” means that con-
scious living higher animals must be substituted with alternative methods
wherever possible, “reduction” means the number of animals used must be
reduced to the minimum necessary to attain valid scientific results, and
“refinement” requires the least severe procedure must be used in any experi-
ment and animal welfare should be paramount. These principles have gra-
dually become the foundation of animal research policy and practice in the
United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), and the United States and
are increasingly incorporated into other governance frameworks interna-
tionally (Canadian Council on Animal Care 2015; Home Office 2013). For
example, when the EU Directive On the Protection of Animals used for
Scientific Purposes was updated in 2010, one of the key aims was to embed
the 3Rs in EU legislation (European Commission 2016).
Within animal research, responsibility is linked to reassurances about
how animals are used and cared for during the research process (Matthies-
sen, Lucaroni, and Sachez 2003) and the 3Rs are a key tool for demonstrat-
ing this responsibility. Table 1 shows how industry, research institutions,
professional scientific organizations, funders, and regulators draw on the
3Rs to demonstrate responsibility. Indeed, Banks (1995) argues that respon-
sibility should be a fourth “R” added to the 3Rs framework. However,
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various critics of animal research are concerned that the 3Rs are not being
fully implemented. Antivivisection organizations dispute there is any use-
fulness in applying the 3Rs because the principles of reduction and refine-
ment implicitly support the continued use of animals in laboratory research
(House of Lords 2002; Rusche 2003). Some critics even describe the 3Rs as
a smoke screen that deflects attention away from debate about the scientific
Table 1. Evidence of the Demonstration of Responsibility through the 3Rs.
Industry
 “It is our responsibility to use the most appropriate methodology and to
aggressively seek scientifically valid 3-R approaches to animal research.” (Merck
2015)
 “At Lilly, we know we have both an ethical and a scientific responsibility
toward animals used in research. That’s why we have adopted ‘3Rs’ when it
comes to our principles of animal care and use.” (Lilly 2015)
 “Our commitment to the 3Rs and high standards of animal welfare begins in
the Code of Conduct, and is reflected in our global Bioethics Policy.”
(AstraZeneca 2015)
Animal research institutions/professional science bodies
 “The 3Rs principles . . . are endorsed and incorporated by all responsible
scientists.” (European Animal Research Association 2015)
 [The University] “ . . . is committed to pursue a policy of reduction,
replacement, and refinement (3Rs) in all animal based research and to
promote knowledge of the moral and legal responsibilities and a culture of
care in all aspects of research.” (University of Oxford 2015)
 “It is the responsibility of everyone who uses animals to ensure that they are
only used when absolutely necessary and that when they are used they are
treated with care and respect. If an animal is used for research, testing or
teaching theworkmust be conducted in linewith theThreeRs.” (Australian and
New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and Teaching 2017)
Regulators/funders
 “Researchers are expected to give appropriate consideration to the 3Rs in
any research involving animals that has the potential to cause the animals
harm and to explain in their research proposals . . . how the 3Rs have been
taken into account.” (National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement and
Reduction of Animals in Research 2014)
 “You must put in place systems which ensure that activities at your
establishment follow the principles of the 3Rs—replacement, reduction and
refinement.” (Home Office 2014, 23)
 “The principles of Replacement, Reduction and Refinement must be
considered systematically at all times when animals are used for scientific
purposes in the EU.” (European Commission 2016)
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validity of using animals for research purposes toward discussions about
animal welfare (e.g., see Safer Medicines 2015). These critiques of the 3Rs
challenge the legitimacy of the current interpretation and practice of labora-
tory animal research governance and call for new approaches to how
responsibility is conceptualized.
“Responsible research and innovation” (RRI) is a recent and broader
approach to responsibly guide contentious scientific research. RRI builds on
previous science governance frameworks with the aim of allowing for a more
inclusive and adaptive approach that will ensure research outcomes are both
desirable and acceptable for society (Stahl 2013). To date, no one has applied
RRI to laboratory animal research. To address this gap, we investigate the
potential value of RRI to enhance responsibility in the controversial area of
animal research governance by examining the 3Rs through RRI. To do so, we
draw on primary research conducted on the Leverhulme Trust program
“Making Science Public: Challenges and Opportunities.” To further under-
stand discourses relating to the 3Rs and constructions of responsibility that had
tangentially emerged from the primary project work, we undertook a scoping
study (Arksey and O’Malley 2005). Through scoping, the aim is to synthesize
and analyze a broad range of academic and nonacademic materials in order to
make a subject area more coherent and intelligible (Davis, Drey, and Gould
2009). Data collection for the scoping study began with four semistructured
expert interviews carried out in late 2014 with UK policy makers. Three inter-
views were carried out face-to-face with individuals who hold senior policy
posts within organizations that either fund animal research or alternatives to
animal use, and one interviewwas carried out byphonewith a senior university
administrator with expertise on RRI policy. These interviews were explora-
tory, with the aim of identifying issues or themes which could begin to shape
our analysis. A documentary analysis exercise was also undertaken, which
included policy documents and other gray literature, media reports, and web-
pages (organizations, institutions, and industry). The majority of these data
were collected electronically through search engines Google and Google
Scholar and through databases such as Web of Science, Lexis Nexis, and
ProQuest. In order to identify relevant texts, we applied various combinations
of search terms relating to responsibility and laboratory animal research/
experimentation/testing and three Rs/3Rs. The scopingmaterials, and insights
from the aforementioned program of research, inform the conceptual and
policy reflections presented here. Through our analysis, we argue that RRI
has the potential to enrich the 3Rs by emphasizing inclusivity of both a broader
range of experts and publics, the importance of scientists’ societal responsi-
bilities, and the broader political dimensions of animal research.
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Responsibility, Scientists, Animals, and Society
Responsibility for the impacts of science has traditionally fallen within the
professional remit of scientists, even when that science has been controver-
sial and linked to broader societal issues (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten
2013; Pellizoni 2004). However, this narrow view of responsibility has been
challenged, particularly in recent years. Douglas (2003) argues that scien-
tists are subject to two forms of responsibility: role and general responsi-
bilities. Role responsibility refers to scientists’ professional duties to
develop scientific knowledge. General responsibility is broader, referring
to scientists’ duty to consider the impact of their research outside of knowl-
edge production, particularly in terms of societal consequences. In the UK,
the role responsibilities of animal researchers can be traced back to the 1876
Cruelty to Animals Act and are embedded in policy documents (O’Dono-
ghue 1980). For example, UK funding bodies and the National Centre for
the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research (2014)
produced a set of guidelines entitled Responsibility in the Use of Animals in
Bioscience Research, which set out role responsibilities for animal
researchers, ethics committees, and peer reviewers to ensure implementa-
tion of the 3Rs. There is no mention of the kind of responsibilities Douglas
refers to as general responsibilities. However, Douglas (2003) insists that
scientists are obligated to consider the wider circumstances of their research
due to their expertise and specialist knowledge. She cautions that if general
responsibilities are not taken into account by scientists, they will relinquish
certain aspects of their scientific freedom because other actors will deter-
mine the appropriate direction and application of research.
Like Douglas (2003), the literature on animal research governance also
frames responsibility more broadly than the role responsibilities of scien-
tists and asks us to think about humans’ responsibilities to animals. For
example, Rowan and Goldberg (1995) argue that the pursuit of knowledge
(role responsibilities) must incorporate an awareness of responsibilities to
humanity, nonhumans, and the wider environment as a whole (general
responsibilities). Similarly, Uvarov (1984) argues that as the beneficiary
of laboratory animal research, society must share responsibility with scien-
tists for animal experiments, particularly when the research is associated
with pain. Haraway takes this argument further, making the case for a more
embodied shared suffering with animal subjects in order to accomplish what
she terms “response-ability” (Haraway 1997, 71-83). Greenhough and
Roe’s (2010) review of Haraway’s thesis discusses how her work corre-
sponds with other scholars who emphasize a shift away from the notion of
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individual accountability (role responsibilities) toward thinking about a
much broader collective responsibility for issues relating to animals (gen-
eral responsibilities; also see Greenhough and Roe Forthcoming). Impor-
tantly, Haraway’s thesis stresses that decisions relating to animal use must
be transparent (in the sense that animal suffering should be openly acknowl-
edged), and only after this acknowledgment can collective societal respon-
sibility be achieved for the harms and benefits of animal research.
The science and technology studies and politics literatures have also
witnessed a reframing of responsibility, developing a broader and more
inclusive concept capable of addressing value-based and political questions
about research. For example, Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe (2012) intro-
duced RRI as a means of reframing responsibility within innovation as a
collective and uncertain activity, where attention is focused on values such
as care and responsiveness, rather than rules-based regulations and guide-
lines. RRI acknowledges the political nature of controversial science and is
focused on the purpose of science, not just the risks. Identifying and nego-
tiating the purpose of research is an inherently political question. They
argue RRI recognizes this political dimension and may create space to
discuss these political questions about the purpose and direction of research.
As such, it requires a broad range of publics and/or experts to shape the
direction of scientific research toward social benefits. The involvement of
multiple actors enables a shared responsibility for alignments to be made
between the social and the technical in shaping the direction and pace of
research (see also Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013).
A benefit of RRI is that it offers a practical framework for action and a
means to consider issues such as power, democracy, and equity. These
issues are not in themselves scientific but are inherent to innovations in
science and technology (Owen et al. 2013). However, it will be difficult to
expand the responsibilities of actors involved in animal research and to
include a broader range of voices. Franco and Olsson (2014) argue that
even though laboratory animal research is strictly regulated, implementa-
tion of the 3Rs is determined by the way in which individual animal
researchers’ acknowledge their responsibilities. Likewise, an examination
of RRI in a UK university showed that for RRI to be successful in practice,
scientific researchers must acknowledge their societal responsibilities
(Hartley, Pearce, and Taylor 2017). However, the value of science for
society and the economy often results in role responsibilities trumping
general responsibilities (Douglas 2003). In practice, this dominance of role
responsibilities may act as a way of “closing down” political and value
questions in animal research governance (Stirling 2008).
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The 3Rs and RRI
In this analysis, we adopt Owen, Stilgoe, and Macnaghten’s RRI frame-
work, which has been developed and applied in a UK academic context and
widely adopted elsewhere, including by the UK’s Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC; see also Owen et al. 2013; Stilgoe,
Owen, and Macnaghten 2013). This RRI framework emphasizes the impor-
tance of reflexivity and inclusion throughout the life cycle of an innovation
process by continuous commitment to four (interrelated) dimensions: (1)
anticipation, (2) reflection, (3) inclusion, and (4) responsiveness. We will
examine the 3Rs through each of the four RRI dimensions, analyzing where
these two frameworks are aligned and where they are not.
Anticipation improves foresight of broad risk issues by encouraging
researchers to think deeply and systematically about potential impacts of
their research, taking into account not only opportunities but also being alert
to social and ethical implications (Owen et al. 2013). In laboratory animal
research, the harm–benefit analysis weighs up anticipated benefits of the
research against potential harms to the animals. As an anticipatory exercise,
the harm–benefit analysis has been criticized for too much focus on the
promissory benefits to health and biomedicine, and not enough consider-
ation of potential harms, as well as a lack of transparency around the ethical
review process (Varga 2013). This same criticism has been levied at scien-
tific research more broadly (Jasanoff 2003; Wynne 2011).
There is space within animal research governance for laboratory animal
researchers to anticipate potential impacts of their research, specifically in
relation to the 3Rs. For example, animal research is regulated under the
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (ASPA) in the UK and each study must
be covered by a project license. This licensing process is overseen by the
UK Government Home Office. The project license application form
includes a section requiring a description of how the researcher will comply
with the 3Rs and requires justification for the use of protocols categorized
as “severe.” In addition, there is now a requirement for a retrospective
assessment of the actual severity of procedures experienced by animals
during the course of the research (for full details of the severity classifica-
tion procedures, see Home Office 2014). While this example does suggest
there is at least some implementation of the aims of an anticipatory dimen-
sion, researchers are not asked to anticipate the social and ethical implica-
tions of their work beyond the 3Rs. This type of “anticipation” closes down,
rather than opens up, consideration of the potential impacts. Animal labora-
tory researchers are only asked about a narrow range of impacts on animals
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and scientific outcomes and not more broadly about their general respon-
sibilities: the purpose of the research remains unquestioned.
Reflection, or reflexivity, directly links responsibility within innovation
practice to the obligation for researchers to reflect on the values that under-
lie their own work and broader governance systems, particularly critically
examining the ethical, political, social, and economic assumptions that
often motivate innovation processes (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten
2013). A consequence of reflexivity is greater openness within science and
innovation about the uncertainties that are part of these processes (Owen
et al. 2013). In animal research governance, it is important for animal
researchers to be able to reflect on the moral and ethical values that are
inherent to animal experimentation (Gluck and Kubacki 1991). While the
majority of animal researchers are considered to be highly principled (Cur-
zer et al. 2016), little space is allowed for reflection on personal values, or
how the purpose of animal research fits within the wider sociopolitical and
economic landscape particularly during the development of research pro-
tocols. Some professional organizations do encourage reflection, however.
Guidance provided by the British Psychological Society (2012, 15), for
example, urges psychologists who use animals to ensure they are fully
informed about the debate on the “desirability of animal research.”
The current UK and EU animal research regulatory systems, like many
other countries, incorporate ethics committees. In the UK, they are called
Animal Welfare and Ethical Review Bodies (AWERBs). These committees
provide the main space for reflection. However, researchers are not nor-
mally encouraged to reflect beyond issues of animal suffering and weighing
up harms and benefits of their research. These committees could be
expanded to allow an opportunity for reflection by opening up a space for
animal researchers to critically evaluate the values and subjective assump-
tions that contribute to their decision-making and the governance of animal
use more broadly. It would be productive for future research to explore how
greater reflexivity could be supported and to investigate how the scientific,
emotional, and ethical processes of coproduction (see Pickersgill 2012)
within animal laboratory research are shaping knowledge outcomes.
Inclusion allows for inclusive deliberative opportunities for citizens,
stakeholders, scientists, policy makers, and so on, and bringing about more
shared decision-making for science and innovation governance (Stilgoe,
Owen, and Macnaghten 2013). Inclusion calls for diversity and input from
both publics and a broader range of experts—particularly in relation to
research with the potential to impact on society (Hartley, Pearce, and Taylor
2017). The importance of including a broad range of actors has been
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explored in relation to controversial, emerging technologies such as
nanotechnology (e.g., Guston 2013) and synthetic biology (e.g., Frow and
Calvert 2013). Currently, animal research governance is expert-driven, with
insufficient mechanisms and opportunities for listening to the views of other
actors (Ormandy and Schuppli 2014). Scientific experts have significant
influence on the development of legislative instruments, such as the UK
ASPA (Lyons 2011). Broader public interests are often assumed to be
represented by animal welfare organizations, such as the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), who have access to deci-
sion makers during the development of animal research governance frame-
works (e.g., RSPCA 2011).
In the UK, public representation at the level of decision-making in
relation to the approval of animal research projects is limited to lay mem-
bership of the abovementioned AWERBs. These bodies consider project
license applications, including ethical issues associated with the use of
animals. They are made up of scientists, animal care staff, a veterinary
surgeon, and normally one independent external lay member (although the
inclusion of a lay member is not mandated). The Science Media Centre, an
independent press office that provides science news to the public, argues
that the function of AWERBS and the ethical review process allows
responsibility to be shared beyond academic and scientific communities
(Science Media Centre 2013). However, relying on this approach to inclu-
sion is wholly inadequate compared to the inclusion described by RRI.
Some animal welfare organizations have called for greater public scrutiny
of project license applications before they are approved (e.g., National
Anti-Vivisection Society 2015), but these calls have been unheeded on the
basis that the public is not qualified to scrutinize animal research propos-
als. Recently, there has been a push for greater transparency in animal
research, which has been resisted in the past due to fears of animal rights
activism. However, the relationship between transparency and inclusivity
in science governance is not necessarily interchangeable. For example,
while UK universities have responded to the recent Concordat on Open-
ness on Animal Research by providing more detailed information about
animal research (Petty-Saphon 2015), there is debate as to whether greater
transparency does actually enable the inclusion of a broader range of
actors in shaping animal research governance (Mcleod and Hobson-
West 2016). Such an opening up of animal research may simply protect
the autonomy and academic freedom of scientists, while continuing to
close down public access to the important political questions about the
purpose of research.
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Responsiveness emphasizes the need for flexibility within research and
innovation processes and the capacity to act and alter the direction of
research in response to changes in social and political norms and expec-
tations (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013). Responsiveness often
incorporates the three previous dimensions by ensuring that the direction
and speed of innovation are determined through a governance process
that includes effective and inclusive opportunities for reflection and
anticipation (Owen et al. 2013). Animal research commentators also
utilize the idea of responsiveness, particularly in relation to its impor-
tance for public confidence in ethical decision-making (Smith and
Boyd 2007). Animal laboratory research is bound up with political issues
concerning multiple competing societal viewpoints about animals and
their moral status and disputes about which types of humane exploitation
of animals are acceptable. This means animal researchers must legitimize
their work by engaging in some form of moral argument that reflects
these societal views.
The fundamental goals of the 3Rs—to incorporate social concerns
into the design of animal research—can be seen as a good example of
responsiveness (see Michael and Birke 1994). There are also some spe-
cific examples where changes in the moral landscape have led to political
changes in the instrumental use of animals, such as the case of monkey
experiments in Denmark, where the moral status of the animals changed
(see Koch and Svendsen 2015). The case of UK and EU public rejection
of cosmetic testing on animals is another important example of this
political responsiveness, which was mainly driven by campaign organi-
zations (e.g., European Coalition to End Animal Experiments n.d.).
However, such changes are not easy or fast as animal research continues
to be a contradictory, complex, and divisive topic (Ascione and Shapiro
2009). Moreover, the 3Rs are embedded within existing governance
frameworks that facilitate and require research design to explicitly con-
sider animal welfare issues and justification of the harms compared to
benefits. However, these frameworks can be an obstacle to change, as
they are closely aligned to established research and development pro-
cesses, where economic objectives may conflict with RRI’s broader
remit (de Saille 2015). While the original goal of the 3Rs was to
encourage scientists to respond to and more directly include societal
concerns in decision-making relating to animal research, the operation
of the 3Rs––within the current regulatory system––opens up science and
welfare concerns to be considered but closes down broader societal
considerations.
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General Responsibility, Inclusivity, and the Political
Nature of Animal Research
An examination of a 3Rs approach to responsibility in animal research
governance through the lens of RRI highlights RRI’s potential both to
challenge and to enhance responsibility. In addition, the case we have
presented here highlights RRI’s anthropocentric concept of responsibility
and care and we argue calls for greater consideration of nonhuman animals.
We will explore these three points in more detail.
First, RRI seems to demand a shift from the current dominant focus in
animal research governance on the role responsibilities of scientists to con-
sideration of the societal impacts of laboratory animal research or what
Douglas (2003) calls, general responsibilities. In thinking about these
broader responsibilities, RRI usefully highlights the political nature of animal
research and offers a structured way to address political issues. The 3Rs rely
on laboratory animal researchers’ role responsibilities, whereas RRI requires
these researchers and a broader range of actors involved in animal research
governance to think about societal responsibilities. The 3Rs have been
described as the metric of progress for demonstrating that the well-being of
animals is taken seriously within laboratory research (Carbone 2012). How-
ever, while the scientific merits of the 3Rs are increasingly being highlighted,
there is little emphasis on the societal dimensions. Instead, scientists are
expected to defer questions relating to societal responsibilities to an intangi-
ble and nebulous society (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Amos 1997) or the
(normally) sole lay member on an ethics committee or AWERB. In other
words, society and the lay public are generally held responsible for the
values-based decisions made in the laboratory (Hobson-West 2012). The
challenge, therefore, is to join up the responsibilities between broader society,
laboratory animal researchers, and the governance structures.
The 3Rs framework has become a vital symbol of good science and
welfare practices that allows considerable room for scientists to consider
their role responsibilities. However, general responsibilities, which encom-
pass broader political values, are not so easily incorporated. Although the
application of the 3Rs opens up a process for ensuring that appropriate
scientific and welfare decisions are being made within the laboratory,
opportunities for deliberation about the wider sociopolitical framing and
decision-making about animal use in response to human health and medical
issues are closed down (Stirling 2008). This is especially pertinent in rela-
tion to questions about who is able to take responsibility for decision-
making on the governance of animal research.
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Second, the analysis highlights the importance of inclusivity to respon-
sibility, particularly the inclusion of publics and experts in decision-making
about animal research. This inclusivity could help broaden the 3Rs’ narrow
focus on science and welfare to include discussion of the purpose of animal
research. The controversial nature of animal research challenges what
counts as responsible and legitimate science (Rupke 1987; Tester 1991)
both in a general sense and when operationalized through the 3Rs. In the
UK, animal rights “extremism,” coupled with expose´s of unethical beha-
viors within some institutions, has created what the head of Animals in
Science Regulation Unit terms a “vicious circle of mistrust” between scien-
tists and wider society (MacArthur Clark 2015). This history continues to
impact on the decision-making of scientists and policy makers (see McLeod
In Press). However, it also highlights the need for opportunities for inclu-
sive discussions about animal research that are not limited to scientific
questions. Guston (2013) argues that the inclusion of previously overlooked
voices within the governance of technology will not necessarily lead to
consensus but can lead to more humane and legitimate ends. In the context
of animal research, Olsson et al. (2012) argue that disagreements over the
purpose of animal research and the values underlying the 3Rs reinforces the
need for a deliberative process which includes both experts and publics.
RRI also calls for a broad range of interdisciplinary expertise in shaping
the direction of research and much of the practice of RRI has been focused
here, offering opportunities for “trading zones” between different disciplines
at the local level of technological development (Murphy, Parry, and Walls
2016). Interdisciplinary collaborations between natural and social scientists
can be an opportunity to clarify and develop key questions concerning labora-
tory animal science and welfare. Working together, social science research-
ers, animal researchers, and other actors can capture an understanding of
“public values” during the innovation process by making differing view-
points more explicit and feeding back information about the research and
innovation processes to broader societal actors. This is clearly a feature of
EPSRC-funded synthetic biology centers in the UK, where social science
involvement has become integrated into large natural science and engineering
projects (see Owen and Goldberg 2010). Kerr (2012) argues that interdisci-
plinarity presents an important opportunity for “matters of care” to become
actionable within RRI and for Science and Technology Studies scholars to
work collaboratively with scientists to help prioritize aspects of care within
research and innovation. When Russell and Burch (1959) first introduced the
3Rs, they urged social sciences and humanities researchers to play a part in
humane experimental design in the animal laboratory (see Kirk
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Forthcoming). However, interdisciplinary work can be difficult, raising con-
cerns about participation, communication, and the importance of supporting
logistics and mediation for the different disciplines (Gunnarsdottir et al.
2012). RRI suggests a potential solution through the embedding of social
science and humanities scholars within animal use facilities. There are some
examples in other areas of technoscience, where this has been productive in
facilitating collaborative and situated critical reflection, allowing a combina-
tion of epistemological approaches between scientists and social researchers.
This “midstreammodulation” approach seeks to build capacity in science and
innovation for versatile reflection and responsiveness to a range of societal
perspectives throughout the research process (Fisher, Mahajan, and Mitcham
2006; Schuurbiers 2011).
Third, the analysis highlights the neglect of nonhuman animals within
RRI. While we argue that RRI can be useful for animal research govern-
ance, we also want to draw attention to its anthropocentric focus. The
“preface” to Responsible Innovation briefly describes how science and
innovation might be conducted taking into account: “a greater moral dimen-
sion, to those living now, those yet to be born, and those beyond our own
species” (Owen, Bessant, and Heintz. 2013, xix, emphasis added). Stilgoe,
Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) also signpost animal experimentation as an
area covered procedurally through existing governance structures. How-
ever, fundamental questions about responsibility to nonhuman actors within
research and innovation pathways have not been explored thus far, and that
is an important area for future research.
Conclusion
Laboratory animal research governance relies heavily on the 3Rs to demon-
strate responsibility. Yet, this interpretation and practice of responsibility is
challenged in this highly contested space. Too often, a 3Rs approach to
responsibility closes down opportunities to challenge the political dimensions
of animal research, particularly its purpose. RRI has the potential to helpfully
augment the 3Rs in three key ways: involving a broader range of experts and
publics in animal research governance; emphasizing the importance for ani-
mal research scientists to take societal, and not just role, responsibilities into
account; and acknowledging the political questions animal research raises.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the University of Nottingham
Synthetic Biology Research Centre.
McLeod and Hartley 13
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was funded by the Lever-
hulme Trust as part of the research program “Making Science Public: Challenges and
Opportunities” (grant number RP2011-SP-013). This work was also supported by the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council; and the Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council [grant number BB/L013940/1], jointly funding
the BBSRC grant number.
References
Arksey, H., and L. O’Malley. 2005. “Scoping Studies: Towards a Methodological
Framework.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8 (1): 19-32.
Ascione, F., and K. Shapiro. 2009. “People and Animals, Kindness and Cruelty:
Research Directions and Policy Implications.” Journal of Social Issues 65 (3):
569-87.
AstraZeneca. 2015. “Responsible Research.” Accessed March 24, 2015. https://
www.astrazeneca.com/content/dam/az/PDF/Responsible-Research.pdf.
Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and Teach-
ing. 2017. Information on Animal Research in New Zealand for Schools. Austra-
lian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and Teaching.
Accessed January 25, 2017. http://anzccart.org.nz/schools/animal-research/.
Banks, R. E. 1995. “The 4th R of Research.” Contemporary Topics in Laboratory
Animal Science 34 (1): 50-51.
British Psychological Society. 2012. Guidelines for Psychologists Working with
Animals. Leicester, UK: British Psychological Society.
Canadian Council on Animal Care. 2015. “About the 3Rs.” Accessed March 24,
2015. http://3rs.ccac.ca/en/about/.
Carbone, L. 2012. “The Utility of Basic Animal Research.” Animal Research
Ethics: Evolving Views and Practices, Hastings Center Report Special Report
42 (6): 12-15.
Curzer, H., G. Perry, M. C. Wallace, and D. Perry. 2016. “The Three Rs of Animal
Research: What they Mean for the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee
and Why.” Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (2): 549-65.
Davis, K., N. Drey, and D. Gould. 2009. “What are Scoping Studies? A Review of
the Nursing Literature.” International Journal of Nursing Studies 46 (10):
1386-400.
14 Science, Technology, & Human Values XX(X)
de Saille, S. 2015. “Innovating Innovation Policy: The Emergence of ‘Responsible
Research and Innovation’.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 2 (2): 152-68.
Douglas, H. E. 2003. “The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists (Tensions between
Autonomy and Responsibility).” American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1): 59-68.
European Animal Research Association. 2015. The 3Rs Principles. Accessed March
24, 2015. http://eara.eu/the-3rs-principles/.
European Coalition to End Animal Experiments. n.d. Cosmetic Testing. Accessed
January 28, 2017. http://www.eceae.org/en/what-we-do/campaigns/cosmetics.
European Commission. 2016. Animals Used for Scientific Purposes. Accessed
January 28, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/lab_animals/ho
me_en.htm.
Fisher, E., R. Mahajan, and C. Mitcham. 2006. “Midstream Modulation of Tech-
nology: Governance from Within.” Bulletin of Science, Technology, & Society
26 (6): 485-96.
Franco, N. H., and I. A. S. Olsson. 2014. “Scientists and the 3Rs: Attitudes to
Animal Use in Biomedical Research and the Effect of Mandatory Training in
Laboratory Animal Science.” Laboratory Animals 48 (1): 50-60.
Frow, E., and J. Calvert. 2013, April. “Opening Up the Future(s) of Synthetic
Biology.” Futures 48:32-43.
Gluck, J. P., and S. R. Kubacki. 1991. “Animals in Biomedical Research: The Under-
mining Effect of the Rhetoric of the Besieged.” Ethics and Behavior 1 (3): 157-73.
Greenhough, B., and E. Roe. 2010. “From Ethical Principles to Response-able
Practice.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (1): 43-45.
Greenhough, B., and E. Roe. Forthcoming. “Exploring the Role of Animal Tech-
nologists in Implementing the 3Rs: An Ethnographic Investigation of the UK
University Sector.” Science, Technology, & Human Values.
Guston, D. H. 2013. “Understanding ‘Anticipatory Governance’.” Social Studies of
Science 44 (2): 218-42.
Gunnarsdottir, K., N. V. Dijk, S. Gutwirth, M. Hildebrandt, and B. Wynne. 2012.
Working Paper on EPINET’s Formal and Informal Assessment Methodologies:
Disciplinarity and Value Commitments. Lancaster, UK: Lancaster University.
Haraway, D. 1997. Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium: FemaleMan#_Meets_
OncoMouse™. London, UK: Routledge.
Hartley, S., W. Pearce, and A. Taylor. 2017. “Against the Tide of Depoliticisation:
The Politics of Research Governance.” Policy & Politics 45 (3): 361-77.
Hobson-West, P. 2012. “Ethical Boundary-work in the Animal Research
Laboratory.” Sociology 46 (4): 649-63.
Home Office. 2013. Guidance: Research and Testing on Animals. Accessed March
25, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/research-and-testing-using-animals#ove
rview.
McLeod and Hartley 15
Home Office. 2014. Guidance on the Operation of the Animals (Scientific Proce-
dures) Act 1986. London, UK: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
House of Lords. 2002. Animals in Scientific Procedures—Report. London, UK: The
Stationery Office.
Jasanoff, S. 2003. “Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing
Science.” Minerva 41 (3): 223-44.
Kerr, A. 2012. “Responsible Innovation: What Next for STS.” Centre for Health,
Technologies and Social Practice, University of Leeds, November 22. Accessed
March 24, 2015. http://thesp.leeds.ac.uk/2012/11/responsible-innovation-what-
next-for-sts/.
Kerr, A., S. Cunningham-Burley, and A. Amos. 1997. “The New Genetics: Profes-
sionals’ Discursive Boundaries.” Sociological Review 45 (2): 279-303.
Kirk, R. G. W. Forthcoming. “Recovering the Principles of Humane Experimental
Technique: the 3Rs and the human essence of animal research.’” Science, Tech-
nology, & Human Values.
Koch, L., and M. N. Svendsen. 2015. “Negotiating Moral Value: A Story of Danish
Research Monkey and Their Humans.” Science, Technology, & Human Values
40 (3): 368-88.
Lilly. 2015. “Animal Research.” Accessed 24 March, 2015. https://www.lilly.com/a
nimal-care-and-use.
Lyons, D. 2011. “Protecting Animals versus the Pursuit of Knowledge: The Evolu-
tion of the British Animal Research Policy Process.” Society & Animals 19 (4):
356-67.
MacArthur Clark, J. 2015. “Science and Society: Why the 3Rs Matter.” Plenary
address to CCAC National Workshop, Montreal, Canada, 30 May. Accessed
August 14, 2015. http://www.ccac.ca/Documents/National_Workshops/2015/
presentations/Science_and_Society-Why_the_3Rs_Matter-Judy_MacArthur-
Clark.pdf.
Matthiessen, L., B. Lucaroni, and E. Sachez. 2003. “Towards Responsible Animal
Research.” EMBO Reports 4 (2): 104-07.
McLeod, C. In Press. “Assuaging Fears of Monstrousness: UK and Swiss Initiatives to
Open Up Animal Laboratory Research.” In Science, Politics and the Dilemmas of
Openness: ‘Here be Monsters’, edited by Brigitte Nerlich, Sarah Hartley, Sujatha
Ramen, and Alexander Smith. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
McLeod, C., and P. Hobson-West. 2016. “Opening Up Animal Research and
Science-society Relations? A Thematic Analysis of Transparency Dis-
courses in the United Kingdom.” Public Understanding of Science 25 (7):
791-806.
Merck. 2015. “Animal Research.” Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.msdrespo
nsibility.com/access-to-health/research-development/animal-research/.
16 Science, Technology, & Human Values XX(X)
Michael, M., and L. Birke. 1994. “Accounting for Animal Experiments: Identity and
Disreputable ‘Others.’” Science, Technology, & Human Values 19 (2): 189-204.
Murphy, J., S. Parry, and J. Walls. 2016. “The EPSRC’s Policy of Responsible
Innovation from a Trading Zones Perspective.” Minerva 54 (2): 151-74.
National Anti-Vivisection Society. 2015. “End Secret Suffering in UK Labs.”
Accessed August 28, 2015. http://www.navs.org.uk/about_vivisection/27/43/
3096/.
National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction of Animals in
Research. 2014. Responsibility in the Use of Animals in Bioscience Research.
London, UK: AMRC.
O’Donoghue, P. N. 1980. “Animal Experiments, Personal Responsibility and the
Law.” In Handbook for the Animal Licence Holder, edited by H. V. Wyatt (pp.
5-14). London, UK: Institute of Biology.
Olsson, I. A. S., N. H. Franco, D. M. Weary, and P. Sandøe. 2012. “The 3Rs
Principle—Mind the Ethical Gap!” In ALTEX Proceedings: Proceedings of the
8th World Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use in the Life Sciences, 2011,
333-36. Montreal, Canada: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ormandy, E., and C. Schuppli. 2014. “Public Attitudes toward Animal Research: A
Review.” Animals 4 (3): 391-408.
Owen, R., J. Bessant, and M. Heintz. 2013. “Preface.” In Responsible Innovation:
Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society,
edited by Richard Owen, John Bessant, and Maggy Heintz (pp. xvii-xxi). Chi-
chester, UK: John Wiley.
Owen, R., and N. Goldberg. 2010. “Responsible Innovation: A Pilot Study with the
U.K. Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.” Risk Analysis: An
Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis 30 (11): 1699-707.
Owen, R., P. Macnaghten, and J. Stilgoe. 2012. “Responsible Research and Innova-
tion: From Science in Society to Science for Society, with Society.” Science and
Public Policy 39 (6): 751-60.
Owen, R., J. Stilgoe, P. Macnaghten, M. Gorman, E. Fisher, and D. Guston. 2013.
“A Framework for Responsible Innovation.” In Responsible Innovation: Man-
aging the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, edited by
Richard Owen, John Bessant, and Maggy Heintz (pp. 27-50). Chichester, UK:
John Wiley.
Pellizoni, L. 2004. “Responsibility and Environmental Governance.” Environmental
Politics 13 (3): 541-65.
Petty-Saphon, K. 2015. “Response to Concordat on Openness in Animal Research.”
Medical Schools Council Open Letter, 22 May. Accessed July 24, 2015. http://
www.medschools.ac.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/MSC-Response-Concordat-o
n-Openness-on-Animal-Research-May-2015.pdf.
McLeod and Hartley 17
Pickersgill, M. 2012. “The Co-production of Science, Ethics, and Emotion.” Sci-
ence, Technology, & Human Values 37 (6): 579-603.
Rowan, A., and A. Goldberg. 1995. “Responsible Animal Research: A Riff of Rs.”
ATLA Alternatives to Laboratory Animals 23 (3): 306-11.
RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). 2011. Amending
the UK Animal Experimentation Law—A Threat to UK Standards. Horsham,
UK: RSPCA Research Animals Department.
Rupke, N. A. 1987. Vivisection in Historical Perspective. London, UK: Routledge.
Rusche, B. 2003. “The 3Rs and Animal Welfare: Conflict or the Way Forward?”
Alternatives to Animal Experimentation 20 (1): 63-76.
Russell, W. M. S., and R. L. Burch. 1959. The Principles of Humane Experimental
Technique. London, UK: Methuen.
Safer Medicines. 2015. “Aren’t the 3Rs the Best Way to Phase Out Animal
Experiments?” Accessed July 24, 2015. http://www.safermedicines.org/page/
faqs_faq16.
Schuurbiers, D. 2011. “What Happens in the Lab: Applying Midstream Modulation
to Enhance Critical Reflection in the Laboratory.” Science and Engineering
Ethics 17 (4): 769-88.
Science Media Centre. 2013. Briefing Notes on the Use of Animals in Research.
Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2013/02/SMC-Briefing-Notes-Animal-Research.pdf.
Smith, J. A., and K. M. Boyd. 2007. “Principles and Practice in Ethical Review of
Animal Experiments across Europe.” Laboratory Animals 41 (2): 143-60.
Stahl, B. 2013. “Responsible Research and Innovation: The Role of Privacy in an
Emerging Framework.” Science and Public Policy 40 (6): 708-16.
Stilgoe, J., R. Owen, and P. Macnaghten. 2013. “Developing a Framework for
Responsible Innovation.” Research Policy 42 (9): 1568-80.
Stirling, A. 2008. “‘Opening Up’ and ‘Closing Down’: Power, Participation, and
Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology.” Science, Technology, &
Human Values 33 (2): 262-94.
Tester, K. 1991. Animals and Society. London, UK: Routledge.
University of Oxford. 2015. University Policy on the Use of Animals in Scientific
Research. Accessed August 24, 2015. http://www.ox.ac.uk/news-and-events/ani
mal-research/university-policy-on-the-use-of-animals-in-scientific-research#.
Uvarov, O. 1984. “Research with Animals: Requirement, Responsibility, Welfare.”
Laboratory Animals 19 (1): 51-75.
Varga, O. 2013. “Critical Analysis of Assessment Studies of the Animal Ethics
Review Process.” Animals 3 (3): 907-22.
von Roten, F. C. 2012. “Public Perceptions of Animal Experimentation across
Europe.” Public Understanding of Science 22 (6): 691-703.
18 Science, Technology, & Human Values XX(X)
Wynne, B. 2011. “Lab Work Goes Social, and Vice Versa: Strategising Public
Engagement Processes.” Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (4): 791-800.
Author Biographies
Carmen McLeod is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford in the
School of Geography and the Environment, where she is currently researching the
social dimensions of the human microbiome. She has also carried out research on
synthetic biology and responsible research and innovation, transparency and
laboratory animal research, and sociocultural and environmental discourses on
duck hunting.
Sarah Hartley is a senior lecturer at the University of Exeter Business School,
where she researches the responsible development of science, technology, and
innovation. Her current work examines the development of GM insects, gene drive,
and genome editing in areas of global health, sustainable agriculture, and food
security in Europe, North America, Africa, and South America.
McLeod and Hartley 19
